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Strengthening Accountability for Urban Services 
 
S. Cavill and M.Sohail  
 
Abstract 
 
Participatory governance is explored in this article in the context of participatory mechanisms of accountability for 
urban services. Accountability has become a buzzword internationally over the past few years, and, as is the case 
with many such terms, there is confusion as to what exactly is meant. The people and organisations promoting 
accountability view it as critical to solving problems with urban services in an increasingly fragmented context of 
service provision. This article seeks to explore the growing interest in accountability and to assess the potential of 
participatory governance to improve the provision of urban services. Other objectives are to: 
• Consider contemporary innovations in the way urban services are delivered – the context of accountability.   
• Define accountability using the existing literature and present current models for accountability.  
• Discuss how the concept of participatory governance can be operationalised in the context of urban services  
• Present initial findings from case studies undertaken in South Africa, Bangladesh, South Korea and UK. 
These case studies are used to illustrate different functions of accountability.  
• Examine the potential of accountability arrangements demonstrated in these case studies to improve the 
quality of local services and the responsiveness of services providers 
 
 
 
Introduction  
The term ‘urban services’ refers here to water and sanitation, street cleaning, solid waste management, roads, 
community halls and street lighting; these facilities require investments in maintenance, rehabilitation, repair, and 
replacement. Urban services require substantial resources and a concern with the effectiveness of their 
performance has resulted in management strategies to oversee operation and maintenance more effectively; 
financing strategies to provide resources for rehabilitation efforts; the introduction of new technologies to improve 
the infrastructure base; and changes to institutional design. However, it has been realised that such supply-side 
techniques alone will not solve infrastructure problems and, increasingly, service users are encouraged to get 
involved in service delivery. 
 
A Focus On Participatory Governance  
 
The term governance reflects a range of relationships between civil society and state1. The governance of urban 
services typically depends on many actors (municipalities, politicians, public officials, urban authorities, public 
agencies, customers (these may be commercial, industrial, public institutions, or domestic), NGO/ CBO, private 
sector, ministries (such as water, health, environment), and agencies of restraints (i.e. watchdogs and regulators). 
Effective urban governance has been associated with good quality infrastructure and service provision together 
with the politics surrounding the provision of infrastructure, which frequently reinforce the inequities in society.   
 
Participatory governance reforms are increasingly seen as a legitimate aspect of urban service programmes. 
Participatory governance in this context refers to the role civil society has in holding service providers to account2. 
It is hoped that direct participation by users in service delivery and policy making will improve accountability in 
services and that improved accountability means that service delivery outcomes also improve as a result. In theory 
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there is a relationship between users’ voice, accountability and service outputs. Tools and methodologies are being 
developed to facilitate participation in governance at the macro level (public participation in audits, policy and 
public expenditure) and micro level (user assessments of services delivery and incorporation of user perspectives 
into planning).  
 
Institutional Development  
 
The World Development Report (1994) 3 reached the conclusion that the institutions traditionally responsible for 
public service provision are the source of most unsatisfactory service. The provision of services has historically 
been seen as responsibility of the state, yet governments have been unable to provide, operate and maintain public 
services in pace with rapid urbanisation and population growth. Public provision of urban services has been 
critiqued on the basis of waste of resources, physical losses, poorly maintained assets, commercial losses due to 
inefficient billing and revenue collection, illegal connections, overstaffing, low service coverage, and poor quality 
of service. Recent policy has emphasised such reforms as the use of competition and more businesslike operation 
of urban services, as well as public sector management approaches (e.g. new laws, internal oversight rules and 
civil service pay).  However, these kinds of institutional strategies have not been as effective as hoped. A more 
contemporary innovation has been the promotion of checks and balances from civil society4 and especially the 
involvement of service users in planning, operating, regulating and financing services at the community and 
neighbourhood level.  
 
Increasing citizen oversight in service delivery is intended, ideally, to make service delivery more accountable 
5and responsive to citizens and performance more effective and predictable. Service users are considered better 
placed to monitor the services on which they depend as they have a greater incentive in this regard as well as the 
information and face-to-face interaction with front line providers. In particular it is assumed that if the poor can 
participate in priority setting and planning for services, as well as monitoring and disciplining providers, better 
services will result. Such an approach tends to be pragmatic; the involvement of service users in promoting 
accountability compensates for weak institutions and regulation; it places an emphasis on the results of service 
delivery  over  the ideology behind decisions and has a focus on people as consumers of services rather than 
citizens.   
 
Participatory Governance in Urban Services  
 
The current debate on urban services has concerned itself to a considerable extent with the new rights of service 
users within a human rights based framework. However, certain commentators suggest effective services are also 
dependent on the fulfilment of user duties as well. Ostrom6 contends “Good agency performance results not from 
strengthening public sector agencies, but from increasing their responsiveness to customers. This fosters an active, 
vocal constituency that puts in motion the accountability mechanisms needed for good agency performance.” 
Similarly, Putnam7  argues “Engaged citizens are a source of discipline and information for public agencies”. By 
implication, then, good services are associated with a civil society characterized by reciprocity, altruism, trust and 
co-operation. Crook and Manor8 suggest that civil organisations can help to foster fairer, more honest, transparent, 
democratic and accountable governance; and Gita Sen9 proposes an understanding of the public sphere where “we 
can think of people participating along with governments in defining needs, in making choices appropriate to those 
needs, and in enforcing accountability.” 
 
Growing interest in accountability for urban services  
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Accountability has emerged as an international issue and talk of accountability has become commonplace in 
service delivery debate. Increasing accountability as a mechanism to tackle problems with urban services has taken 
place within a particular political and social context. Prevalent trends include an emphasis on the individual; result-
based service delivery; demand management; the use of private sector thinking and practices in public service 
delivery; and attempts at creating similar working cultures across the private, public and voluntary sectors. 
 
“A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify 
them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct” 10. Accountability has a number of functions; 
Jabbra and Dwivedi 11  argue the term also ought to include administrative, legal, professional, political, and moral 
components. O’Donnel 12 (states that accountability operates in different directions, and has distinguished between 
horizontal accountability (“the capacity of state institutions to check abuses by other public agencies and branches 
of government”) and vertical accountability (the means through which citizens, mass media and civil associations 
seek to enforce standards of good performance on officials.) Recently, citizens have been involved directly in the 
workings of horizontal accountability institutions, for example, through public hearings or participatory auditing. 
Goetz and Gaventa 13 call this ‘diagonal accountability’. 
 
Where once the focus of accountability was on government and institution building, attention is now paid to the 
relationship between field level service providers and users. Service providers are accountable in a number of 
ways: for their actions, spending, outputs and outcomes, use of resources, performance standards and so on. Front 
line service providers are typically accountable through hierarchical relationship upward to government and 
downward to services users. Proponents of more accountability claim that front line service providers have too 
much discretion in their activities (making them lazy, corrupt and untrustworthy) and have too few sanctions. This 
has allowed service providers to become ungovernable, unaccountable and unproductive 14. The focus on front line 
providers seems to reflect a frustration with bureaucratic, centralised service provision, and is mostly associated 
with the public sector. It is suggested that it is much easier to achieve accountable urban services when users 
participate in service delivery 15 for example when users share responsibility for setting performance plans, goals 
and standards for service delivery as well as evaluating services in terms of outcomes. Accountability is also 
improved when users have  face-to-face contact or a personalised relationship with the service provider 16 17 . 
 
Paul 18  presents a model of accountability for urban services that focuses on users’ decision making when faced 
with declining urban services. He suggests they may “exit” (choose an alternative service) or voice their 
dissatisfaction about the quality of service. Paul argues that if service delivery is failing ‘hierarchical control’ (e.g. 
monitoring and incentives) relays these signals to service providers. Paul is in effect suggesting that improvements 
in the quality of services can best be achieved if individuals pursue their own interests. This points to a potential 
for less equity in service provision, which would favour those individuals who are better at bargaining for better 
services. The World Development Report 2004 19 has developed Paul’s framework for analysing accountability for 
urban service by distinguishing between a “short route” (between citizen and service provider) and a “long route” 
(citizen, policymakers, service provider). The delivery of urban service is then mainly a question of better 
management of the relationship between government, users, and providers. The World Development Report 2004 
report presents a number of ways to improve the ability of service users to monitor and discipline service 
providers; for example, by increasing user participation in service delivery as well as by giving poor citizens a 
stronger voice in policy making and political process. In effect, these strategies aim to reduce the cost and to 
increase the user’s incentive to take collective action and to monitor the performance of providers. They also 
increase the rewards to citizens for using their voice  
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The accountability ‘problem’ has essentially been articulated as one of communication. Improved communication, 
and especially the ‘voice’ of users, is needed by service providers if they are to understand customer needs and 
priorities better. User voice can also have a disciplining effect, ensuring that service delivery becomes more 
efficient and effective. Citizen involvement in the provision of urban services accountability can be seen as a 
means by which individuals protect their rights as consumers 20. This is especially important in the absence of the 
market mechanisms 21. The frequent use of term “consumer” is consistent with a business context, and deliberately 
contrasts with some public sector traditions and values. It is also in contrast to more political terms such as 
“citizen” and reflects a call for the withdrawal of the state from service delivery. Alternatively, user voice can be 
articulated through the political structures of representative or participatory democracy 22.  Users are expected to: 
become informed about the infrastructure in their neighbourhood; ensure facilities are kept in good condition; 
express concerns to public officials; attend meetings held about infrastructure problems; become involved in 
advocacy groups; demand continuous and timely maintenance; and become involved in infrastructure decisions, 
planning and long term investment. However, Hirschman 23  asserts that those most able to use voice, the most 
articulate, are those who seek high quality products, and are therefore most likely to exit when services decline in 
quality. 
 
How does accountability work? 
 
The literature typically uses the Principal Agent Theory to analyse the problem of accountability within 
institutions. This theory describes a relationship in which a principal (service users in this case) attempts to secure 
services from an agent (service providers). Agents are expected to hide the information principals require to 
monitor their performance; thus, contracts, incentives, sanctions are needed to induce agents to deliver the desired 
type of and level of performance. Participatory accountability arrangements can foster better services by reducing 
the transaction costs of service users. These costs associated with monitoring services can be reduced by the 
publication of such information such as service delivery plans and procedures, O&M schedules and charters 
outlining users’ rights and obligations in service provision. In economic theory, information dissemination reduces 
the uncertainties of coordinating such collective action as participation in service delivery. Participatory 
accountability arrangements or ‘civil regulation’ 24  also provide agents with incentives and sanctions to deliver 
services to the desired level of performance.  
 
Demands for accountability from others imply some form of power: “To talk about accountability, is to define who 
can call for an account and who owes a duty of explanation” 25. Typically, service providers are presented as 
neutral arbiters of competing user interests, all of who have an equal opportunity to express their views. 
Furthermore, there is an assumption that producers will respond to inputs in a balanced and rational manner and 
that better services will automatically result. However, Skelcher 26  claims there is an imbalance of power in the 
server-served relationship, where providers have the ability to determine the service delivery agenda and ground 
rules for their relationship with users. In fact, “professionalism and bureaucracy are resistant to outside 
participation” 27, for example “by ignoring consumer demands; making closed decisions; not providing alternative 
choices; breaking promises; withholding information; not providing adequate support.” 28. Plummer’s research 29 
found that internal reforms are required to facilitate community participation in municipal planning; otherwise the 
municipality may remain anti-poor, detached and inaccessible, and staff will block the development of 
participatory initiatives.  
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Methodology  
 
This research set out to test the hypothesis that accountability arrangements improve the sustainability of urban 
services using the case study methodology. Case studies are based on information collected from field visits and 
semi-structured interviews, closed answer questionnaires30, document review, newspaper articles and direct 
observation in study areas. The data was collected from July 2002 to July 2003. Case studies were chosen on the 
basis that they offered a different perspective on accountability. The kinds of arrangements differ in terms of 
innovation, reach and scope, replicability, sustainability and social impact. A short case summary is given below 
before key findings from an initial data analysis are presented. 
 
Case study 
location  
Key feature of the initiative being 
researched  
Mechanism  
Seoul, Korea  Improve the responsiveness of 
service providers 
Information dissemination, creating competition in 
service delivery and customer service reforms.  
Dhaka, 
Bangladesh  
Increasing the influence of service 
users 
Citizen scorecards, grassroots pressures groups and 
NGO provision 
Bristol, UK  Improve the design and delivery of 
services 
Best Value and New Deal for Communities 
programme.  
Mdantsane, South 
Africa 
Increase political participation in 
representative democracy 
Ward Committees, new rights to services and 
customer service reforms  
 
The Seoul case study illustrates reforms to improve the responsiveness of service providers. Following the IMF 
crisis in 1997, Mayor Goh implemented a reform of Seoul Metropolitan Government on the basis of zero tolerance 
of corruption. In Seoul, Mayor Goh abolished public officials discretionary administrative power, staff were 
regularly rotated and individual responsibility over a specific area was abolished to remove scope for discretionary 
administrative behaviour. Transparency was increased through ‘benign ethical competition’ in city administration, 
aimed at creating competition between departments. Seoul Metropolitan Government established online 
information disclosure systems; integrity systems in procurement; electronic bidding system; and citizen 
inspection system (related to corruption).  They also introduced a Citizen Evaluative Survey31; Citizen’s Charter32 
Saturday Date with the Mayor33; Email the Mayor program; and Corruption Report Card to the Mayor; as well as a 
public officials’ code of conduct. Results are based on non-deprived areas as well as on substandard residential 
areas of squats called Binilhaus (constructed from thin wood with a vinyl covering on the outside). Service 
provision in the case studies included household connections for water and sewerage, tarmac roads, pit latrines and 
standpipes.   
 
The Bristol case study illustrates attempts to improve the design and delivery of services in through integrated and 
more locally responsive delivery of waste collection, street cleaning, grounds maintenance, household bulky 
collection, gully emptying and recycling services in a neighbourhood of Bristol called Barton Hill. Project 
Pathfinder in Bristol is a partnership between Bristol City Council, SITA GB Ltd, ResourceSaver (an NGO which 
operates the kerbside ‘black box’ recycling collection service under a subcontract) and Community at Heart (a 
resident-led organisation established to deliver the New Deal for Communities anti-deprivation programme in the 
area). Making better use of publics services is key to New Deal for Communities and involves “bending” services 
(matching supply of service to the scale of the problem) and “reshaping” services (tailoring service to the needs of 
a neighbourhood). The principles of Pathfinder include: the location of a multi-skilled team in a dedicated area 
with a local one-stop-shop to act as a coordinating base; better customer relations; and more efficient and effective 
service provision. Project Pathfinder is gaining national recognition for its innovative approach to neighbourhood 
street management and democratic, accountable service delivery. 
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The South Africa study focuses on the role of representative democracy and political participation in attempts to 
get more appropriate and accessible public services. South Africans have two key mechanisms for improving the 
responsiveness and performance of service providers: popular participation in government through direct and 
representative methods, and a focus on providing more results-based and client-orientated public services. Ethical 
and fair service delivery is one of the hallmarks of post apartheid South Africa, where previously services were 
explicitly organised around apartheid imperatives. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, (1996) grants 
all citizens an equal and inalienable right to housing, health care, water and social security. Local government is 
supposed to be developmental i.e. it works with citizens to find sustainable ways to meet their needs and improve 
the quality of their lives. The Municipal Structures Act (1998) outlines the mechanisms for consulting citizens, 
encouraging the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government, 
and setting out the role of ward committees and the community liaison officers in promoting participatory 
democracy. The Municipal Systems Act (2000) outlines a system of participatory governance and focuses on the 
duties of residents and communities to pay for services and to participate in the affairs of the municipality in 
planning, performance monitoring, service delivery, communication and decision-making. The following 
observations are based on a study of a suburb of East London called Mdantsane, which, under apartheid, was 
developed as a dormitory town in the former Ciskei, politically and administratively separate from East London. It 
was incorporated into the city in 1997. Mdantsane is the 2nd biggest black location in South Africa after Soweto. 
Service provision in Mdantsane includes household connections for water and sewerage, tarmac roads, pit latrines 
and standpipes.   
 
The Dhaka case study is intended to illustrate attempts to increase the influence of service users in holding 
service providers to account for performance, particularly where service providers are unwilling to accept legal 
responsibility for slum dwellers. A feature of service delivery in Dhaka is competition; there is an increasing 
number of profit and non-profit service providers as well as ‘proxy’ market indicators to stimulate better 
responsiveness. The case study investigated community initiatives that fill the gaps in service provision. For 
example municipal waste collection cannot match the demand in the city in certain wards of Dhaka community 
organisations have been created to collect household waste. These community-based organisations are run on a 
cost recovery basis as micro-enterprises and are usually found in middle income areas where householders are 
willing to pay for a house-to-house collection service. In lower income areas water and sanitation projects have 
been implemented by NGOs to ensure residents have access to a safe and legal supply of water and sanitation. . 
The research also investigated the use of governance scorecards and grassroots pressure groups to improve service 
delivery. Research focused on non-deprived areas as well as squatter areas of the city. 
 
Reflections from case studies 
 
Based on a brief overview of the case studies, there seem to be four key things that organisations promoting 
accountability for urban services are doing:  
•  Directing attention towards improving the effectiveness of the service itself; 
•  Making accountability a function of good customer relations and improving the capacity of the 
individual service user for action and initiative;  
•  Creating mechanisms to support a more collectivist approach through campaigning, lobbying and 
advocacy to services at both local and national levels;  
•  Improving services through encouraging competing, alternative provision.  
These kinds of support for accountability are clearly different and represent contrasting understandings of 
accountability and of what constitutes adequate service performance. 
 7
 
Failing urban services 
 
 
In the last 12 months, the majority of respondents in Bangladesh and Bristol complained about water and 
sanitation services. In Mdantsane complaints were about roads, and in Seoul the main problem was refuse 
collection. In general all respondents were concerned with overall provision, with the quality of, and information 
about, drains, roads, streetlights, and community halls, and also with the information supplied on refuse collection. 
In Bristol respondents were most dissatisfied with street sweeping. Men tended to complain more often about 
sanitation, roads and drains; women complained mostly about streetlights. Those in non-deprived areas tended to 
complain more about refuse collection and streetlights, whereas respondents from deprived areas complained more 
about sanitation and roads. Access to community services (like streetlights, drains, and community halls) and the 
level of household services were both typically lower in deprived areas. 
 
In Dhaka, Seoul and Mdantsane the majority described urban services as undependable, unresponsive, inefficient, 
disinterested, and undependable. Respondents in the main were also dissatisfied with their relationship with 
service providers, claiming that providers didn’t care and didn’t take complaints seriously. Typical comments 
were: ‘Its difficult to get improvements’, Service providers don’t take complaints seriously’, and ‘service providers 
don’t care about people like me’. However, respondents in Seoul and Bristol also noted that ‘Service providers are 
helpful and friendly’; in Seoul, they said ‘Users are kept informed about the progress of complaints’ and in Bristol, 
‘Service providers are more responsive now’ and ‘are happy to hear users’ ideas’. 
 
The use of participatory mechanisms and processes  
 
Following the transition to democracy in South Korea, civil society continues to exert influence over government 
in a variety of ways at the municipal level, at the Gu (ward level), dong (neighbourhood) and ban (street or block) 
level. At the municipal level, participation occurs through a number of mechanisms:  assemblies that monitor how 
budgets are spent; city hall meetings; resident requests for audit and investigation of local administration; 
committees set up by SMG, such as the Citizens Committee for a Green Seoul; Citizen Petition (used primarily by 
interest groups to initiate local policy change); resident voting on serious local government matters (but this has 
never been undertaken in practice). People can also visit local Gu and dong level administrative offices if they 
have problems with services in their neighbourhood as well as attend Bansanghoe. These are widely held monthly 
meetings to discuss ban (street level) matters, report problems, and promote good relations with neighbours. These 
meetings are unofficial but residents are encouraged to attend. Organised civil society also serves as a check on the 
influence of the state and private companies, and monitors corruption in Korean society.  
 
The Project Pathfinder in Bristol also attempted to regularise participatory mechanisms of accountability into these 
kinds of durable, institutionalised structures through the introduction of weekly and monthly stakeholder meetings. 
However, residents in Bristol preferred accountability to be more ad hoc and opportunistic, taking place outside 
formal organisations. For residents, catching the Pathfinder team on their rounds or calling into the one-stop-shop 
and leaving a message on the Project Pathfinder notice board were more important in shaping accountability. 
 
In South Africa, ward committees have become the preferred way of structuring participation and involving 
communities in municipal affairs. Each ward committee has a ward councillor and 10 elected members; five 
represent the community of the ward and five represent sectors, such as youth, women, business, religion, and 
sport/ culture. Ward committees assist and advise their ward councillor, act as a communication channel between 
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the community and ward councillor, ensure that their ward councillor accounts for his/her actions, and encourage 
resident participation in attempts to improve quality of life in their ward. Special provision is made for people who 
cannot read and write, people with disabilities and other disadvantaged groups. The main function of the ward 
committee is to ensure that communities participate in setting development priorities for their ward and in the 
preparation, implementation and review of the Integrated Development Plan (IDP). Municipalities are required by 
law to report annually on progress against their IDP objectives, which are linked to the political term of office, and 
can be seen as a contract between the municipality and the community for service delivery and good governance. 
Service delivery performance can also be measured against the Batho Pele or People First principles34.     
 
Ward committee members in Mdantsane felt they had a responsibility in service delivery, most had written letters 
to the municipality, called or visited the public works office; talked to staff and held meetings to discuss resident’s 
problems with the services in Mdantsane. However the majority of members had received no response to their 
complaints, one member said “we do say things but we don’t have a voice”. Committees have been trained to take 
on responsibility for planning and budgeting according to the priorities of residents in their ward, however 
fieldwork revealed capacity is still lacking. The ward committee studied faced a number of constraints: they lack 
resources (and often fund expenses themselves), powers, office and administrative equipment and limited 
knowledge of their role and function. The lack of resources and capacity affects the committee’s ability to get the 
needs and priorities of residents recognised in the agenda and practices of service providers. The committee has 
also been criticised for not consulting or even conflicting with existing civic structures (such as SANCO – South 
African National Civic Organisation). The observation was made that the ward committee was politicised 
(members revealed party alliances in meetings) and not entirely inclusive in practice (for example men tend to 
dominate discussion). Committee members have been made scapegoats by residents for nationwide frustration 
with the delivery of services, which at times is violent. 
 
Attention was also focused at the ward level in Dhaka. Ward commissioners are responsible for inspecting 
municipal services in their wards and also hear residents’ complaints. They, in turn, verbally communicate the 
matter to the zonal office for action or take it up with the departmental head in the City Corporation for special 
attention. This is typically a loose arrangement with no scope for citizens to access information on the progress of 
complaint. A recent attempt to assess user satisfaction as well as the quality of infrastructure in Bangladesh has 
been the Governance Scorecard, a collaboration between PROSHIKA, Survey and Research System (SRS), World 
Bank and donors. The Scorecard was completed in 2001 and its use revealed that the majority of people are 
dissatisfied with services. The Scorecard is built on the following premises: that the information it yields will be is 
new and useful to service providers; that service users will lobby for improvements; and that service providers will 
respond to negative feedback and user demands. Since the completion of the Scorecard, PROSHIKA organised a 
workshop with the service provider agencies to discuss the findings of the Scorecard.  It seems that service 
providers are all too aware of the state of the services delivery and there has been little follow up activity since on 
the part of civil society. Report cards have been used more successfully by Transparency International Bangladesh, 
in the main because the NGO also created grassroots pressure groups called Committees of Concerned Citizens 
(CCCs) to disseminate report card findings, generate debate on infrastructure provision and lobby for higher 
quality public services through a variety of means – citizens meetings, newsletters, research papers, seminars and a 
press campaign to improve local services. 
 
The Dhaka case study also investigated a partnership among Dushta Sasthya Kendra, WaterAid, World Bank, 
UNICEF, and the government utility (DWASA) to provide legal access to safe water points, latrines, washing 
blocks, solid waste management, storm water and drainage in slum areas. Community mobilisation, along with the 
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fact that dwellers are now paying for legal access to services, has empowered residents to approach and negotiate 
with DWASA and Dhaka City Corporation. “There was a time that slum people never had the ability to talk to the 
DWASA people but now they play with WASA [Dhaka Water and Sanitation Authority] (..) Recently, one senior 
engineer attended a workshop [with slum communities] and he was astonished (..) he said why these people are 
shouting? He is telling to me that it is the first time he heard the community voice and they are blaming us” (NGO 
worker). However, accountability to local clients can also be undermined when public service functions are 
contracted out to the private or NGO sector (Wood, 1994; 541). 
 
Instances of non-participatory accountability  
 
The potential of payment for services was raised as a means to amplify people’s voice, in Mdantsane in particular. 
Payment can make users more vigilant and demanding of improvements in service efficiency and accountability, 
and the threat of non-payment can act as an incentive for service providers. Non-payment for services is a 
significant problem in South Africa; academics have provided two conflicting explanations of this trend. The first 
is that non-payment for services relates to an inability to pay for services or people are unwilling to pay for 
services due to a ‘culture of non payment’ that developed during apartheid or because of the low quality of 
services provided. Whatever the reason, non-payment means that municipalities aren’t collecting sufficient 
revenue to improve the service and thus a “catch 22” develops. The Dhaka case highlighted the potential of 
unofficial payments (bribes) to circumvent the system and solve problems with services; these may be asked for by 
officials or paid by users in anticipation of problems. However, this strategy appears to be only a stopgap in cases 
of acute problems since supply often remains unpredictable. Users complain of regular power outages, low water 
pressure, and infrequent garbage collection, and resolving these chronic problems usually necessitates further 
under the table payments or the influence of powerful intermediaries (political leaders; influential friends, and 
mastaans -muscle men). Dhaka City Corporation has a grievance redressal system for complaints about its 
services. However, only a small proportion of households are aware of it or bother to use formal mechanisms35. 
People feel that there will be no follow up to their complaint and that officials are often unavailable or indifferent.    
 
Exit, rather than attempts to improve the quality of service through campaigning, lobbying and advocacy, has 
therefore become a pragmatic consequence of poor urban services. NGO service provision has been used, 
particularly in Dhaka – for waste management for middle class areas in Dhaka and water and sanitation in slums. 
In theory, this is assumed to create competitive pressure on public providers for better services and also to have a 
role in inducing public pressure for better services. Although pragmatic, the focus on alternative service provision 
is perhaps at the expense of political analysis and political movements to improve municipal services. Exit (and the 
ability to buy choices) from service provision undermines the position of those people who depend on municipal 
services. In recognition of the tendency for certain users to exit public service provision36 and of the weak voice of 
users of public services, aid conditionality was used in Dhaka to discipline providers and substitute for users’ voice 
(for example private sector involvement was a pre-requisite for World Bank funding).  
 
How effective are participatory mechanisms?  
 
The hope that participatory mechanisms of accountability for urban services will create rationality and 
predictability in service delivery depends to a great extent on how well information is converted into action, 
specifically the detection of wrongdoing.  Information can increase trust, reduce information asymmetries, and 
substitute for responsiveness to service users. Respondents from the case studies found out about services in a 
number of different ways, some directly from service providers (in the form of leaflets) and some in indirect and 
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general ways such as through TV, newspapers, and also word of mouth. In general, users were more likely to be 
informed about service related issues than to engage at an earlier stage of service delivery i.e. policy formulation. 
However respondents hadn’t typically used the information they had about services to get improvements. This is 
particularly true of those in deprived areas and those with inadequate incomes. Most respondents stated that they 
hadn’t seen any information (issues of information asymmetry) and that they weren’t interested in finding out 
about services. Service users in Mdantsane and Dhaka didn’t know what kinds of service they were supposed to be 
getting, what workers were supposed to be doing, or what they could expect of service quality. Users hadn’t in 
general made the leap from experiencing a problem with a service to realising that better information about 
declining services could act as leverage to help solve the problem. 
 
The effectiveness of these mechanisms depends on a shared understanding between users’ and providers’ concept 
of accountability. In South Africa, the majority of respondents thought service providers should be accountable for 
meeting service quality requirements; in Seoul, for responding to complaints; and in Dhaka, for consulting users. 
These varying kinds of accountability also represent different stages of service delivery. However, most service 
providers considered themselves only accountable for the quality of service delivered, and considered user 
satisfaction with services a by-product of getting the technical hardware right. Service providers were keen to 
stress respondents’ responsibilities – for example, in cleaning water tanks and replacing pipes, putting refuse out at 
the correct times or in separating recycling.  
 
Improved services?  
 
Of those respondents who had complained directly to service providers about services, the majority in Bangladesh 
and South Africa were dissatisfied with the way the complaint was handled. Those in South Korea were mostly 
fairly satisfied. Most complaints were about private, excludable services like water and sanitation, as well as 
specific community services like refuse or roads.  Far fewer respondents complained about streetlights and drains. 
Those in non-deprived areas were more likely to use the official channels and to be satisfied with the handling of 
complaints. However, respondents had different perceptions of complaint mechanisms. In South Africa, the 
majority of respondents perceived them as fair. In Seoul, these mechanisms were reported to be easy to use. 
Respondents in Dhaka said they are well publicised. Self-interest predominates as the reason why respondents 
complained about urban services in the case studies, particularly in non-deprived areas. Interestingly, those in 
deprived areas were more likely to say they complained in the community or general public interest, and these 
respondents’ choice of complaint mechanism (i.e. meetings, petitions, protest) also revealed a bias toward 
collective activities. 
 
Analysis of the case studies revealed that respondents from deprived areas solved problems with urban services in 
more roundabout ways. Sometimes this took place through formalised and structured means like public meetings, 
meetings with councillors, voting for politicians, and approaching other public figures who also have a catch-all 
responsibility; sometimes in more spontaneous and opportunistic ways such as protests and petitions. Unlike those 
in non-deprived areas, the poor generally did not use the channels offered by service providers  (free phones, 
Internet sites, visits to offices, suggestion boxes and so on). This finding seems to challenge some of the existing 
thinking on accountability. The poorer respondents appear to diversify their approaches to accountability and to 
have a repertoire of activities and strategies to deal with failing urban services. This may be related to their claim 
that service providers’ offices aren’t easily accessible, but also to the fact that they didn’t trust services providers. 
In contrast, wealthier respondents from non-deprived areas tended to have one predominant strategy, which is a 
dependence on the mechanisms offered by service providers. These respondents were also more likely to perceive 
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an improvement in the delivery of urban services following on the improvement of accountability. Thus, for this 
group, service provider-related mechanisms for accountability seem to work better than ad-hoc arrangements in 
terms of improving services, although whether these channels would be as effective for poorer respondents is 
unclear. It might be that it is not the mechanism but the personal characteristics of users that is key in securing 
better services. This finding has significance for the current interest in promoting short rather than long routes for 
accountability (WDR 2004), but also for those officials who stated that they know a service is satisfactory when 
there are no more complaints.  
 
All service providers claimed in interviews that greater accountability had ‘tremendously’ improved the services 
they provide. However, in most cases user satisfaction with services had not increased markedly since changes to 
provider responsiveness had been introduced. This could be because of raised expectations and standards -- better-
informed citizens may be less tolerant of poor performance.  For example, the results of the Citizen Survey in 1999 
in Seoul led to higher service standards and better customer relations being instituted in the Water Works 
department; nonetheless, in 2000 citizens rated water as one of the worst services. Similarly, the Project Pathfinder 
has the best standard of work in Bristol and a more customised way of providing services, yet the majority of 
respondents said there had been no improvements in services or the appearance of the area. Service providers from 
South Africa were clear that, despite improvements in service delivery since democracy, service users expect a 
higher standard than the minimum RDP standards. Residents are  not happy with gravel roads, pit latrines and 
standpipes and furthermore they are not likely to be happy if their standard of living hasn’t improved in other ways 
(for example if they are unemployed.) In Seoul, the general public distrusts the quality of water supply – residents 
complain about the colour, taste, smell, or sediment in their water supply and are worried by media scares about 
bacteriological quality. To date, strategies to recreate trust include proof of quality, free bottled water, involving 
residents in water quality inspection, and international benchmarking like ISO 9000, and Charters . However, even 
if service providers give more and more information, users may remain dissatisfied unless service providers 
produce the kind of information that generates trust.  The Water Works department, as a result, has paid for 
marketing and favourable media reports. 
 
Evaluation of participatory mechanisms for accountability 
 
 
Accountability is premised on a relationship with another; you have to participate to get accountability. However, 
few citizens (and particularly marginalized groups) exercise their rights to participate. There are many reasons for 
this; for example ‘customers’ of urban services make different use of services, have different levels of dependency 
on services, different perceptions of entitlements and priorities, and different capacities to organise. In some 
instances, respondents were willing to devote time and resources to common effort to pursue common goods, for 
instance through complaints about the operation and maintenance of roads, community halls, streetlights and 
drains. However, a substantial number of respondents, when faced with problems, chose not to take any measures, 
at least not officially, despite being affected by adverse outcomes. This was true even where organisations have 
been established and information asymmetries reduced. Respondents were more likely to opt for individual 
interests at the household level (i.e. complained about water supply or sanitation) over common interests. On one 
level it seems that some respondents had performed a kind of cost benefit analysis as to whether to participate in 
collective action (based on resources, benefits, sense of responsibility for services, trust, predicted outcomes, 
relative bargaining power and fall back position), and that they decided they were better off not contributing, but 
hoping the problem would be resolved by the participation of others. However, the issue of relative bargaining 
power should be given closer examination. Some respondents would never dream of approaching service providers 
or felt discouraged by personal experiences; (“If they laugh in your face (..) you are not going to shout about 
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things,” said a respondent from Bristol). The key point is that accountability is not simply formulaic – a matter of 
put the mechanisms in place, and demands for better services will follow. It has far more emotional complexity 
than this. When ease of communication or empowerment is perceived to be an issue, users may prefer shortened 
lines of communication with front line providers and word of mouth solutions as in Bristol, more anonymous or 
distancing IT solutions as in Seoul 37, or institutionalised ward structures as in Dhaka and Mdantsane.   
 
Surprisingly, the research revealed that the perception of having a voice in service delivery was mainly associated 
with respondents with low incomes living in deprived areas. This was particularly true in Dhaka. However it was 
clear that service providers did not feel equally accountable to all service users. While the poor felt they have a 
voice in service delivery, it is clearly not a very powerful or effective voice since service levels in their 
neighbourhoods remain technically inadequate and it has failed to increase the political risk of inadequate services 
(the ‘threat from below’). On the other hand, users from non-deprived areas tended to be dissatisfied because of 
high expectations that providers are not able to meet; these users were also less tolerant of poor performance. Care 
should be taken in promoting greater accountability to pay attention to issues of power and equality, in order to 
avoid what Gaventa 38 (2002) calls “voice without influence.” 
 
Likewise, the focus on front line providers within a principal agent framework seems somewhat shortsighted. The 
Bristol case study reveals the importance of non-monetary incentives such as good will, job satisfaction and 
commitment as the basis for accountability to improve urban services. In Dhaka, frontline workers are presented 
with a moral obligation (as well as financial incentive from bribes) to provide services to citizens regardless of the 
legal status of their dwellings, particularly given the absence of penalties and the existence of loopholes in 
bureaucratic procedures. Under Project Pathfinder, employees felt empowered by their jobs. They had greater 
responsibilities as well as greater flexibility to tailor services to customers and to deal with emergency repairs. 
Some residents in Bristol said “It’s not the services; it’s the people who make a difference”. This suggests that 
accountability could be viewed as an extension of methodological individualism i.e. good service is a sum of all 
individual service provider actions. However, in Dhaka, respondents rejected this tendency to confuse the 
accountability of the organisation with the person working for it; instead good people depend on good systems; 
“Its not my friend:  it’s the system we are talking about,” said a respondent from Dhaka.  
 
The extent to which accountability arrangements have made society more governable is debateable. In theory, user 
participation will lead to more accountable service providers and better services will result. Although to be fully 
accountable implies the use of sanctions to prevent or punish misbehaviour, the existence of sanctions as well as 
the capacity to make use of sanctions is often lacked by users in deprived areas 39.  Participatory modes of 
accountability have the potential to undermine traditional notions of horizontal accountability (such as professional 
accountability), conflict with vertical accountability (such as managerial accountability and political 
accountability) and result in the containment and management of user dissatisfaction. However, in cases where 
accountability arrangements have coordinated users’ voice (such as ward committees or Committees of Concerned 
Citizens), this appears to have generated a consensus on a range of conflicting interests, reduced the number of 
competing claims on financially limited resources, and increased the efficiency of response to complaints and in 
the use of resources. However, in other cases accountability arrangements have fragmented users’ voice. The 
outcome can be that more problems are presented than can be dealt with by service providers and that urban 
governance has been undermined. Civic involvement has sometimes been frustrating for service providers when, 
despite all their efforts, services fail to meet the expectations of more informed, motivated, effective and 
empowered citizens. This was particularly true of NIMBY concerns about incinerators in Seoul. Accountability 
arrangements may have transformed city governance but not for the better. However in the Bristol case, 
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participation in service delivery was definitely perceived as a mechanism to improve personal feelings of 
empowerment and urban governance; “from being a person who is on benefits and taking just what life deals them 
to getting to a point to where they connect with other people’s lives around them, doing things together, 
collaborating to take charge of something. It is very important and Pathfinder is an important part of that 
process” (respondent from Bristol).   
 
Conclusion  
 
It would be expected that greater participation in services would improve the accountability of service providers 
and that more accountability should enhance service outcomes. However, this research found that in practice, 
accountability does not seem to fulfil the particular functions described by theoretical approaches. This research 
investigated different mechanisms of accountability to citizens. These included improving the responsiveness of 
service providers through better customer services and formal grievance procedures; increasing the influence of 
service users through opinion surveys, grassroots pressures groups and NGO provision; improving best value in 
the design and delivery of services in low income areas; increasing political participation in representative 
democracy and giving citizens new rights to services. This research found that the reforms made front line 
providers of services more accountable to some extent, and that the performance of services improved marginally 
as a result. However, the analysis suggests that improvements to accountability haven’t improved user satisfaction 
with planning, delivery and maintenance of urban services. On the whole, respondents thought they were only 
slightly better off than they had been before reforms were introduced. The majority reported that levels of services 
has remained the same or worsened, and user satisfaction with agency response to requests and complaints has not 
changed markedly. Thus, it could be concluded that there has been no substantial change in user satisfaction during 
the period since practices have undergone change. However, in the long run (this might mean decades) one would 
expect participatory accountability mechanisms to lead to improvements in service outcomes and user satisfaction.   
 
The research found that approaching councillors and voting for politicians, public meetings, protests and 
organising petitions emerged as the most useful mechanisms for securing accountability. In particular, users from 
deprived areas appeared to prefer more participatory mechanisms, those with an indirect influence on service 
providers, as well as arrangements where residents could sort out problems directly with front line service 
providers. By contrast, service users in non-deprived areas seemed to prefer to engage with systems of hierarchical 
control over front line service providers through an upward chain of command.  Furthermore, this research 
suggests that, particularly in deprived areas, service users seldom rely on a single mechanism to produce 
accountability.  It was observed that participation in such attempts depends on a range of factors, including 
resources, incentives and motivation to improve urban services, the kind of benefits to be gained (personal or 
common), the nature and location of the services in question, the intensity of concern with services, and the 
sustainability of the accountability created. 
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